Lest We Forget–JFK was as ‘friendly’ with the Jews as Trump is

ed note–now that I have crossed the 1,000,000,000 (that’s BILLION with a ‘B’,  not MILLION with an ‘M’) mark in explaining to short-sighted people suffering from a certain degree of knee-jerk reactionism that just because Trump may have a daughter who converted to Judaism and that he has said some nice things about Israel and Netanyahu that this does not equate to him being ‘a zionist’ who is ‘owned by the Jews,’ I thought it pertinent and relevant to allow the irreplaceable Michael Collins Piper, author of the equally-irreplaceable book ‘Final Judgment’ that exposed Israel’s role in the assassination of JFK do my explaining for me. Please note those passages marked in red which indicate that despite JFK proffering himself as a ‘friend’ of Israel and surrounding himself with powerful Jewish figures in order to get elected, nevertheless, once he got through the front doors of the WH, things obviously changed. The handful of passages reposted here are but a small number of equally-relevant passages in the book showing the very nuanced and sophisticated game of chess that was being played at that time, where Kennedy said/did certain things in order appease organized Jewish interests and thus win the election but how all of that went the way of the DoDo bird once he became President.

Those interested in reading this fantastic and history-changing book can do so here

Ch 5–JFK’s Secret War With Israel

The history books have told us of John F. Kennedy’s epic struggles with Fidel Castro and the Soviets in the Bay of Pigs debacle and the Cuban Missile Crisis. 

Yet, only in recent years have we begun to learn of Kennedy’s secret war with Israel. Much of the conflict stemmed from Israel’s determination to build a nuclear bomb.

This is a hidden history that helps explain in part the dynamic forces at work resulting in Kennedy’s assassination. 

By mid-1963 Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion hated Kennedy with a passion. In fact, he considered JFK a threat to the very survival of the Jewish State. 

One of John F. Kennedy’s first presidential appointments was naming his former campaign aide Myer (Mike) Feldman as his point man for Jewish and Israeli affairs—an important post, especially considering JFK’s tenuous relationship with Israel and its American lobby.

According to author Seymour Hersh, ‘The President viewed Feldman, whose strong support for Israel was widely known, as a necessary evil whose highly visible White House position was a political debt that had to be paid…’

However, the administration was determined to make certain, according to Hersh, that nobody—Feldman in particular—would be able to circumvent any administration policy insofar as the Middle East was concerned. 

‘The President’s most senior advisors, most acutely McGeorge Bundy, the national security advisor, desperately sought to cut Feldman out of the flow of Middle East paperwork.’ Hersh quotes another presidential aide as having said, ‘It was hard to tell the difference between what Feldman said and what the Israeli ambassador said.’

‘ZIONISTS IN THE CABINET ROOM’ 

President Kennedy himself had his own suspicions about Feldman, according to the president’s close friend, Charles Bartlett (to whom Kennedy in 1960 had previously voiced concerns about Israeli influence as noted in Chapter 4).

Bartlett recalls a visit with the new President at his home in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts one Saturday on the Jewish Sabbath. Talk turned to Feldman’s role in the White House bureaucracy. ‘I imagine Mike’s having a meeting of the Zionists in the cabinet room,’ the president said, according to Bartlett.

The President’s brother, Robert Kennedy, himself said that his brother admired Feldman’s work, but added, ‘His major interest was Israel rather than the United States.’

However, while Myer Feldman was busy promoting Israel’s interests at the White House, the president was sending out a message to the rest of the foreign policy-making establishment in Washington.

Kennedy was making it clear that he was very much interested in finding a path to peace in the Middle East and was, in particular, looking for ways to solve the problem of finding a home for the Palestinian refugees who had been displaced by Israel in 1948.

KENNEDY’S GOOD INTENTIONS 

According to Hersh, ‘State Department Arabists were pleasantly surprised early in 1961 to get word from the White House, according to one source, that ‘just because 90 percent of the Jewish vote had gone for Kennedy, it didn’t mean he was in their pocket.’

Former high-ranking U.S. diplomat Richard H. Curtiss, writing in ‘A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute,’ elaborated on Kennedy’s attitude toward the Middle East controversy. In a chapter appropriately titled: ‘President Kennedy and Good Intentions Deferred Too Long,’ Curtiss comments: ‘It is surprising to realize, with the benefit of hindsight, that from the time Kennedy entered office as the narrowly-elected candidate of a party heavily dependent upon Jewish support, he was planning to take a whole new look at U.S. Mideast policy...’

‘He obviously could not turn the clock back and undo the work of President Truman, his Democratic predecessor, in making the establishment of Israel possible. Nor, perhaps, would he have wanted to.’

‘Kennedy was determined, however, to develop good new personal relationships with individual Arab leaders, including those with whom the previous administration’s relations had deteriorated.’

‘As a result, various leaders of newly independent countries were surprised to find their pro forma messages of congratulations upon Kennedy’s assumption of office answered with personalized letters from the young American President.’

OLIVE BRANCH TO NASSER 

The key Arab leader at the time was Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, the voice of Pan-Arabism. Kennedy was especially intrigued with the possibility of opening up relations with Nasser. 

According to Kennedy associate, Theodore Sorensen, ‘Nasser liked Kennedy’s Ambassador, John Badeau, and he liked Kennedy’s practice of personal correspondence. Kennedy put off, however, an invitation for a Nasser visit until improved relations could enable him to answer the political attacks such a visit would bring from voters more sympathetic to Israel.’

(Unfortunately, however, as noted by Richard Curtiss, ‘As with most good intentions deferred, the invitation to Nasser for a personal meeting with Kennedy was never issued.’

Thus, it was that upon assuming office, Kennedy made positive attempts to contact Arab heads of state asking how the U.S. could help each country in its individual disputes with Israel.

STANDING BY TRADITION

However, Kennedy wanted one thing in particular understood by all sides in the conflict: the new U.S. president wanted ‘to make it crystal clear that the U.S. meant what it said in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950—that we will act promptly and decisively against any nation in the Middle East which attacks its neighbor.’

This policy was directed not only to the Arabs, but Israel as well.

Kennedy did indeed mean business.

ISRAEL’S LOBBY REACTS 

Soon after Kennedy assumed office, Israel and its American lobby began to understand the importance of Kennedy’s positioning with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel was not happy—to say the very least—and began putting heat on the White House through the aegis of its supporters in Congress, many of whom relied upon support from the Israeli lobby for campaign contributions and political leverage.

According to America’s most noted longtime Jewish critic of Israel, Dr. Alfred Lilienthal: ‘While the President, more often through Vice President Lyndon Johnson, gave much lip service to Israelist aspirations, his administration continued to resist pressures, including a round-robin petition signed by 226 Congressmen of both parties (aided by a large New York Times advertisement on May 28, 1962) to initiate direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. Kennedy had decided to shelve his pledge in the Democratic platform to bring Israeli and Arab leaders together around a peace table in order to settle the Palestine question.’