A new think tank report posits that ‘even extensive efforts to reduce collateral damage can lead to a loss of diplomatic support if the information environment is not actively managed.’
ed note–another eye-opener that every war-weary Gentile with a vested interest in his/her own future survival needs to read, understand, and take deeply to heart.
Firsto, ladies and Gentile-men, if everything that the world has been told concerning the entire ‘Jewish state’ thing were true, namely that the Jews are the ‘chosen’ people and that the creator of the universe really, really, REALLY wants them in that ‘promised’ land, then there would be no need for ‘crafting’ the narrative, ‘managing’ information, etc, etc, etc.
Remember, as we have all been told now for thousands of years, this same ‘god’ who loves his ‘chosen’ people so much that he was willing to engage in all sorts of fantastic demonstrations of this ‘love’, including plagues, parting of oceans, pillars of fire, manna from heaven, etc, is a ‘god’ without comparison, and therefore, is certainly not threatened in the least by ‘misinformation’ that prevails on various media outlets the world over.
What this shows, fellow Gentiles, is what utter liars the Jews are. They say on one hand that their ‘god’, their ‘yahweh’, is the biggest, baddest, and bestest of all the gods, without peer in terms of his might and moxie, but then, demand that information (the truth) that ‘complicates’ what it is they are trying to achieve (the subjugation of the entire world) be ‘managed’ through their usual ‘tricks of the trade’, which is murdering the messenger in order to murder the message.
Lest we forget, ladies and Gentile-men–
Or, as the old saying goes, ‘The more things change, the more they remain the same…’
Jpost
A key lesson of the Gaza war is that ‘even extensive efforts to reduce collateral damage can lead to a loss of diplomatic support if the information environment is not ‘actively managed,’ according to a newly-released think tank report.
In ‘Tactical Lessons From Gaza’, the report homes in on the notion that ‘Gaza has illustrated how failing to swiftly address the information domain can undermine military successes and even limit operational freedom.’
According to the report, ‘Israeli officials conceded that they were caught off guard by how swiftly they lost the ‘information high ground’ online in the early days.’
The report is clearly sympathetic to Israel’s narrative and critical of the global media for often slanting its coverage toward Hamas’ narrative, but the report makes it clear where Jerusalem made errors that the West should avoid.
For example, if a Western country is stuck in a conflict against a terrorist or asymmetric adversary who tries to delegitimize Western military force by inflating war crimes allegations, the report suggests that ‘Western forces might consider inviting (or at least not barring) credible neutral observers or embedded journalists’ to the battle zone.
During the second Battle of Fallujah (Iraq 2004), the report noted that ‘US forces embedded journalists to showcase the care they took in fighting insurgents in a city. Of course, this can backfire if something adverse happens on camera, but transparency can build trust that ‘they’re not hiding anything.’’
In contrast, the report states, ‘The Israeli ban on journalists reporting freely in Gaza is understandable due to the well-documented risk of coercion/harm to journalists by Hamas from previous conflicts.
‘Israel’s decision to bar journalists from independently entering the Gaza Strip during the war stems primarily from a legitimate safety concern, but has indeed led to the accusation of ‘hiding things,’ the report states.
Furthermore, ‘Israel has been repeatedly accused of ‘targeting journalists,’ particularly when media personnel were killed during firefights or airstrikes. These accusations, often amplified without full context (ignoring the well-documented terror links of many ‘journalists’ in Gaza), have placed the IDF in a bind: allow access and risk allegations of war crimes when journalists are inevitably harmed, or deny access and appear secretive and controlling.’
The report concluded on this point, ‘While the logic of exclusion is understandable, Israel’s approach was excessively binary. A near-complete denial of access undermined transparency, fueled adversarial narratives, and allowed misinformation to spread unchecked. A more nuanced solution would have been to permit limited, controlled access under clear conditions.’
The report added that ‘This could include carefully screened embed programs, escorted convoys into humanitarian zones, and a transparent, nonpartisan media accreditation process.
Journalists still not allowed to enter Gaza
In contrast, Israel continues to prevent journalists from visiting Gaza other than in highly scripted visits, even three months after the October ceasefire.
Separate from the question of how to integrate journalists into battle zone coverage, the report also discussed that a ‘key lesson is the importance of speed and adaptability in strategic communications. Western militaries typically have layers of clearance for releasing information, which can be too slow in the era of social media.’
‘Western forces should establish rapid response teams within their public affairs or information operations units to disseminate verified information within minutes of an incident. This may involve delegating authority to on-scene commanders or IO officers to post updates on official channels without navigating the entire chain of command for approval, provided there is prior guidance on what is acceptable to say,’ stated the report.
According to the report, ‘This approach carries risks, but being preemptively truthful is preferable to constantly playing catch-up to adversaries’ disinformation.’
Interestingly, the report said that the IDF attempted this kind of rapid response, and even got ahead of itself when the IDF Spokesman’s Department rushed out what turned out to be a false account of the Golani Brigade in one major incident where it mistakenly killed aid workers in April 2025.
In contrast, the experience of The Jerusalem Post during the war has been that, except for half a dozen or so incidents where the IDF responded with speed, the IDF generally responded at a snail’s pace to the vast majority of hundreds of incidents reported by the media.
Communicating with the public on multiple levels
Next, the report said that responding fast with one message is insufficient. ‘Western militaries must communicate on multiple levels: with factual briefings for analytical audiences, human-centered storytelling for the general public, and possibly entirely different framing for various cultural contexts.’
It also warned, ‘The Gaza war has also revealed new information warfare techniques, such as widespread use of visual propaganda and deepfakes. Hamas has repeatedly used fabricated images and audio, repurposing victim photos from other conflicts, like Syria, to influence public opinion.’
‘Western forces should invest in counter-disinformation capabilities, both to quickly debunk false content (such as having open-source intelligence (OSINT) teams ready to perform image forensics on viral photos) and to broadcast authentic content to drown out fakes,’ he cautioned.
Moreover, the report stated, ‘If a media agency reports a number of casualties, the military cannot simply say ‘not true’ without evidence; it needs to either provide its own data or work with that agency to reconcile differences.’
In contrast, in the vast majority of hundreds of incidents of alleged war crimes reported by the global media, Israel has still not given a detailed response to specific incidents more than two years after the start of the war and months after the ceasefire began.
The report acknowledged that providing rapid responses ‘can be exceptionally difficult in the social media age, and may even be impossible.
Either way, it highlights the challenges of messaging in modern warfare. In Gaza, the absence of independent verification on the ground has made the information war even murkier, as demonstrated by disputes over casualty numbers.’