IDF materials show that soldiers reloaded their magazines multiple times while shooting at 12 aid workers who tried to identify themselves
Haaretz
The Israeli army unit that murdered aid workers in Gaza’s Rafah last month had received a report about increased ambulance traffic on the route shortly before the incident.
The report also reveals that the soldiers fired at the vehicles continuously for three and a half minutes – even from point-blank range – reloading their ammunition multiple times, despite attempts by the aid workers to identify themselves.
These are the findings from materials collected after the incident, some of which were submitted to the IDF operational investigative teams and the IDF General Staff investigative team.
These materials, made public here for the first time, indicate a lack of operational discipline among the IDF Sayeret Golani unit, as well as a lack of credibility in the versions of events provided to commanders and investigators.
The investigation conducted by the IDF General Staff investigative forum, a summary of which was made public last week, was intended to address the harsh international criticism following the incident in which 15 aid workers were killed.
However, it did not present the full picture. Haaretz now presents additional details that shed more light on the unit’s conduct during the incident.
This information was provided to Chief Military Prosecutor Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, who is reviewing the testimonies and evidence collected in the investigation to determine whether there is a basis for opening an investigation by the Military Police Criminal Investigation Division.
The General Staff investigation, headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Yoav Har-Even, found that in three separate incidents, forces fired on ambulances and a UN vehicle, frequently deviating from orders. The public summary of the investigation stated that ‘the forces did not fire indiscriminately.’
Some of the materials indicate that in one incident, indiscriminate fire towards a convoy of aid vehicles did occur and lasted for three and a half minutes.
On the night of March 23–24, when the incident occurred, the IDF was preparing for a surprise assault on the Tel al-Sultan district of Rafah, planned for March 24. In the days leading up to it, forces from the 36th Division and the Gaza Division had deployed in the area.
During the cease-fire, the army observed that a significant number of Hamas fighters from the Rafah Brigade had returned from the humanitarian zones in al-Mawasi, where they had been hiding, and were attempting to reorganize the brigade, which had been severely weakened during the war. An evacuation notice for Tel al-Sultan was scheduled to be issued to local residents at 8:00 A.M., and the surprise offensive was intended to cause the militants to flee.
The Sayeret Golani unit, operating as part of the 14th Brigade, was tasked with setting up an ambush without being detected before the evacuation order was issued. Their mission was to ambush a location where the army believed Hamas militants would attempt to flee under the cover of the civilian population and to strike them.
The force set out around 2:00 A.M. and positioned itself along a route expected to be used by civilians evacuating toward Khan Yunis and al-Mawasi. The IDF has a mechanism to allow aid organizations operating in Gaza to travel safely on otherwise restricted routes.
However, the route where the Israeli force positioned itself that night was one where travel was permitted for rescue personnel and civilians at the time. Therefore, the aid and medical workers using it were not required to request special permission – contrary to the IDF’s initial statement following the incident.
At around 3:30 A.M., another IDF unit under the command of a deputy company commander from the same brigade reported over the battalion’s radio about increased ambulance movement on the route. The report did not mention any suspicion regarding the ambulances. The Sayeret Golani unit, which heard the report, was positioned 30 meters (roughly 100 feet) from the route.
At 3:57 A.M., an ambulance with flashing lights passed through the area on a routine trip. The occupants could not see the hidden troops. Positioned on higher ground, the troops were not under threat of a ramming attack and had been ordered not to reveal themselves before the main offensive on Tel al-Sultan.
The entire area was dark during the incident, and it was impossible not to notice the ambulance’s flashing lights – this is evident from footage of the incident held by the IDF, which was captured by drones accompanying the force.
The deputy commander of the Sayeret Golani force instructed the entire force to prepare to fire on the ambulance that was approaching the ambush site.
As the ambulance was about to pass near the force, the soldiers opened fire on it. The force charged toward the vehicle while shooting, killing two aid workers.
The soldiers then turned off the rescue vehicle and its lights and concealed the bodies.
After the initial shooting, the force returned to its ambush position. At 5:06 A.M., a convoy of rescue vehicles, including ambulances and fire trucks, traveled along the route. All the vehicles had their lights on and flashing – it would have been impossible not to see them in the dark area.
In his testimony, the deputy battalion commander claimed that, once he believed the people killed in the first vehicle were Hamas operatives, he concluded that the rescue convoy approaching the scene was actually a group of Hamas operatives who had heard about the incident and arrived to retrieve the bodies of their comrades and attack the Sayeret Golani Unit.
A scenario in which Hamas operatives travel in marked rescue vehicles to a location where they know IDF troops are present is one that the army had not ever before encountered during the fighting in Gaza. As such, neither the investigation team nor the brigade command accepted the deputy battalion commander’s version of events.
The convoy of rescue vehicles slowly approached the ambush site, heading towards the location where the bodies of the first ambulance’s occupants were found. Contrary to claims that the convoy posed a threat to the force, the incident’s documentation raises doubts about whether they were aware of the soldiers’ presence.
The convoy stopped near the attacked vehicle, and medical teams disembarked to move towards the bodies, on the opposite side of the route, effectively distancing themselves from the IDF ambush site. The medical personnel wore fluorescent vests and kept their identification lights on, along with the sirens, to make their presence clear, fearing they might be targeted by the IDF.
As the convoy stopped, the deputy battalion commander ordered the force to open fire on the vehicles. Those equipped with machine guns were instructed to fire from the ambush position, and the rest of the force was ordered to charge toward the convoy.
The distance between the convoy and the soldiers was only between 20 and 30 meters, meaning that the entire force could clearly see, even through night vision equipment, that the people were not armed militants but medical personnel.
The soldiers who charged reached the aid team within seconds and fired continuously for approximately three and a half minutes. The soldiers reloaded their magazines and kept shooting even after it was clear that no return fire was coming from the other side – and despite the cries of the aid workers who tried to identify themselves.
Some of the aid workers attempted to flee into open terrain, but by the end of the three and a half minutes of close-range gunfire, 12 of them had been killed.
The deputy battalion commander reported the incident to the brigade but initially stated that the convoy was unidentified, without flashing lights, and claimed that the decision to open fire was made due to a perceived threat to the force, although footage held by the army contradicts his account.
The brigade commander again spoke with the deputy battalion commander to assess whether the force had been exposed and if the element of surprise for the assault on Tel a-Sultan, for which all 36th Division forces were already positioned, had been compromised.
The brigade commander instructed the deputy battalion commander to hide the bodies in the ground and to bury and crush the ambulances.
At no point did the brigade commander suggest transporting the bodies to Israel or transferring them to international aid organizations.
During discussions about how to proceed – about 12 minutes after the IDF’s assault ended, while the forces were still at the scene and the ambulances remained on the road – a UN vehicle arrived, carrying a UNRWA worker. In footage held by the army, the UN vehicle is seen arriving slowly, apparently aware of what was happening and likely having received reports of the shooting at the aid workers.
The vehicle approached with its lights on, seemingly attempting to signal its presence to the IDF force at the scene. The UN worker did not leave the vehicle or approach the soldiers, but the deputy battalion commander decided to fire at the vehicle, joined by one of the soldiers – they killed the UN worker.
At this point, the IDF realized that the force had been exposed, and that both those in Gaza and international organizations were aware of the IDF’s shooting.
The brigade commander ordered the force to finish burying the vehicles and bodies and to mark the location, but the senior division and brigade leadership preparing for the assault understood that the conduct of the deputy battalion commander and the brigade commander was ‘problematic’ and, above all, jeopardized the operation and the soldiers involved, which was scheduled to begin around 10:00 A.M.
The IDF’s Southern Command and the Gaza Division believed the force’s actions had exposed it, and fearing damage to the element of surprise, decided to move the assault on Tel a-Sultan up by two hours. At 6:00 A.M., local residents were given notice to evacuate the area.
In the morning hours, the IDF provided international organizations with the location where the bodies had been hidden so they could retrieve them. Although attempts were made to locate the bodies, they were not found, and the organizations were ordered to leave the area.
The following day, the commander of the 14th Brigade returned to the scene of the incident, unearthed the buried bodies using engineering equipment and covered them with sand, marking the location with camouflage-colored netting so it could be identified.
The Red Crescent and the Civil Defense organization stated that the aid workers killed in the incident were Mustafa Khafaja, Izz al-Din Sha’at, Salah Ma’amar, Rifaat Radwan, Muhammad Bahloul, Ashraf Abu Labda, Muhammad al-Hila, Raed al-Sharif, Yusuf Khalifa, Fuad al-Jamal, Zuhair al-Farra, Anwar al-Attar, Samir al-Bahabtza, Ibrahim al-Maghari, and Kamal Muhammad Shakhtut.