Israel must make 2 critical demands: No easing of economic sanctions on Iran, and no restrictions on Israel’s freedom of action.
ed note–we’ll forego the usual extended commentary for something ‘short & sweet, as the saying goes.
As it is with all things wafting out of the diabolically-deranged brain and equally diabolically-deranged mouth of Judea Inc, understand that the devil in the details is NEVER what the Jews claim it is, but rather, ‘something else’ that for reasons rooted in their own strategy of achieving world domination, must be kept hidden.
And in this case, that ‘hidden’ thing does not deal with nuclear weapons or ‘saving the Iranian people from a terrorist theocracy’, but rather, what Torah Judah-ism commands be done to those who get sideways with the Chosenbergs and the same world domination that, come hell or high water, they are intent upon achieving, to wit–
‘For the nation or people which will not bow down and serve you shall perish, they shall be utterly destroyed…’ Book of Isaiah
Meir Ben Shabbat for Israel Hayom
‘They had an impressive ability to take punishment. They gave us their word that they wouldn’t be shooting at ships anymore, and we honor that.’
These words were spoken by Donald Trump, not in recent days, and not in connection with Iran. They were said in May of last year, regarding the Houthis in Yemen, shortly after the President announced the end of the military operation against them. At the time, he responded to Oman’s mediation initiative and decided to cease fire without removing the threat. In February of this year, in the wake of the war with Iran, the Houthis resumed attacks on Israel.
President Trump does not need this lesson from the Houthi episode to understand with whom he is dealing on the Iranian side. He himself has repeatedly accused the regime in Tehran of lying and breaking promises. The representatives who will arrive today for talks in Islamabad represent that same regime. Some of the faces have changed, but the ideological outlook remains as it was. They will sit at the negotiating table with a sense of confidence, encouraged by their success in withstanding the American-Israeli war machine, in turning the Strait of Hormuz and the vulnerability of the Gulf states into effective leverage on Washington, and in casting doubt on the prospects of regime change.
Tehran knows that none of this compensates for Iran’s losses or conceals the weaknesses exposed during the war. After the previous blow in Operation Roaring Lion, it suffered another severe surprise attack, this time while braced for war. It lost its supreme leader and a sizable portion of its political and security leadership. Its defense arrays and formidable intelligence services were exposed as porous in the face of American-Israeli capabilities. It lost strategic, military, infrastructural, and economic assets; damaged its relations with regional states; remained in striking isolation without any external support; and struggled to mount a meaningful military response against American and Israeli forces, whether through its own capabilities or via proxy actors. The war deepened the economic pit in which it had already been mired beforehand. In many areas, Iranian systems were set back by years.
Yet despite all this, Iran arrives at the negotiating table not from a position of surrender, but with bargaining leverage. It has managed to optimally combine the use of its remaining capabilities with the constraints and concerns in Washington, thereby maximizing pressure on the White House. Tehran is well aware of four major American concerns: a prolonged war, the introduction of ground forces, rising energy prices, and the possibility that enriched uranium remains in Iranian hands.
What is Iran trying to achieve now?
In simple terms: conditions that will ensure some semblance of political and social stability for Iran’s rehabilitation and rebuilding.
Iran is demanding guarantees against the resumption of war, the establishment of a new order in the Strait of Hormuz that would increase its economic control there, the lifting of economic sanctions, and an arrangement that leaves enrichment capabilities in its hands. It opposes restrictions on its missile program, and will not commit to practical steps that would endanger the existence of its proxy organizations.
Once the fire has ceased, the regime’s leaders in Tehran view negotiations more as an opportunity to extract the resources and conditions necessary for recovery than as a source of pressure against them.
From Israel’s perspective, its strategic position today is far better than it was on the eve of the war: Iran’s strategic capabilities have suffered a severe, though not irreversible blow; the regime’s stability has been shaken, even if it remains standing and Israel has once again demonstrated its military strength to the region and the world.
The primary challenge Washington will face in any arrangement with Iran is preventing the regime’s recovery. The easing of military pressure alone will provide the conditions for this, certainly if the current economic sanctions are lifted.
The second challenge is preventing restrictions on Israel’s freedom of action against Iran or against the proxy organizations it operates. The regime’s attempt to incorporate Lebanon into the current ceasefire points in this direction.
Therefore, Israel must insist on preserving its freedom of action against any enemy and any threat, in every locale, and on every front.
After witnessing Iran’s performance in the current war, and previously in Operation Roaring Lion and the ‘Night of Missiles,’ there is no need to argue for the necessity of restrictions on its missile program. A state that has turned missiles into a thriving industry, for itself and for its proxy organizations, and that deliberately, systematically targets population centers across the region cannot be left with capabilities that enable it to continue doing so.
Another challenge is ending Iran’s support for its proxy organizations. This, too, is linked to the resources that Iran will have at its disposal to rebuild its capabilities, and constitutes an additional argument against lifting economic sanctions.
Trump understands that any negotiation with representatives of the regime is not interpreted merely as a concession on the aspiration to topple it, but also as strengthening its legitimacy and potentially paving the way for its reinforcement. Despite his declarations, it is reasonable to assume that the President also believes that as long as this regime exists, it will not change its ambitions or alter its course. On the contrary, the current war will serve as proof for those within it who believe that a military nuclear capability is essential for ensuring its survival, and, as a result, it will spare no effort to achieve that goal.
Therefore, in order to preserve the chances of political and social collapse, Iran’s severe economic conditions must not only be maintained, but made worse.
The Iranian protesters, who are still waiting for a green light from the President, may ultimately act on their own when they recognize the opportunity, so long as the regime’s distress persists, and that is something that Israel must ensure.