Analysis: Iran's next step and the Israeli-Saudi options

I24NEWS

The nuclear agreement between the major powers and Iran provides Iran with the option of building a bomb at some point without effective international supervision. An inevitable result would be a balance of mutually assured nuclear destruction between Iran and the US, Europe and Israel, and could result in attempts by Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, to develop a military-nuclear option.

At the same time, Iran will be able to enhance its conventional weapons arsenal, especially with the help of Russia and China. The gradual lifting of economic sanctions will generate additional revenue for Iran, allow it to break into new markets and strengthen its regional strength.

The crucial question is whether Iran will use its new strategic-military-economic achievements to promote military and political aggression, or – whether it will contribute to stability and prosperity at home and in the Middle East, as the US hopes. One can safely assume that the fundamentalist religious regime in Tehran, once armed with a nuclear bomb, will not rush to drop it on its Sunni enemies or on Israel, for fear of the West’s reaction. Tehran is especially aware of Israel’s deterrence capabilities, based on long-range nuclear ballistic missiles (according to foreign sources). It would therefore not endanger its people, cities and economic infrastructure.

Iran is far likelier to take advantage of its newfound power to promote its strategic interests in the Middle East, especially to strengthen the “Shiite axis” which it has been leading for some time. In other words, to fortify the Shiite regime in Baghdad, the Alawite (pseudo-Shiite) one in Damascus, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. In order to do so it could well intensify its fight against the Islamic State, which threatens both Iraq and Syria, and send additional military forces – especially armed militias – to defend those regimes against the Sunni extremists. It will work in conjunction with the United States, thereby contributing somewhat to regional stability.

But beyond the issue of stability, Iran cannot afford to cede Shiite control of Iraq, and especially of the Shia holy sites in Karballah, Najaf and Baghdad. These places are of even greater importance to the Shiites than the holy sites in Qom and Mashad in Iran. Together with Syria it will also maintain its massive support of Bashar Assad, who constitutes an essential link with Hezbollah and the regional Shiite axis.

Not only that, but Iran could make use of its new power to strengthen Shiite communities under Sunni-Arab rule in such oil-rich states as Bahrain (70% Shiite), Kuwait (30-40% Shite) and Saudi Arabia (10-15%). This would designed to undermine these regimes in the long run and take control of their oil resources. Such a policy would fuel Saudi efforts to form a stable coalition with the regional Sunni states and Israel – in the face of the strategic and ideological Shite threat.

One can safely assume that the two leading Sunni states in the region will not respond to these efforts. Sunni Turkey does fear Iran’s nuclear prowess, but also its reaction, and it is greatly dependent on its massive trade with Tehran. It will thus be very hesitant to join a warlike anti-Iranian coalition. Egypt, too, which recently improved ties with Saudi Arabia and enjoys its financial bounty, will not rush to face off against relatively distant Iran, being tied up as it is with its war against IS and the stabilization of its regime and economy.

Israel appears to be the only reliable and promising ally for Saudi Arabia in its right against Iranian nuclear proliferation, and Riyadh would undoubtedly agree to help Israel bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities by allowing Israeli bombers to fly over its territory. But it is also clear that Israel has lost this offensive military option, mainly because of the objections of the international community.

An Israeli bombing of the Iranian nuclear facilities could perhaps delay the development of a bomb by two-three years, but will energize Iran into redoubling its efforts – without having to deal with significant international objections. Iran and Hezbollah would likely also respond by firing off tens of thousands of missiles at Israel, resulting in numerous fatalities.

The most reasonable option for Israel and Saudi Arabia is to establish a regional Sunni-Israeli strategic alignment, tasked with blocking Iran’s political and economic influence and creating a credible military deterrence against it. But the main condition for establishing such a daring alignment is solving the Palestinian problem, using the 2002 Saudi peace initiative, backed by all the Arab and Muslim states. Such a solution could pave the way to Israel’s integration in the Muslim-Sunni sphere in order to confront a nuclearizing Iran and its allies.

It could, for example, act to neutralize Iranian influence in the Gulf states, and to help the Sunni opposition in Syria, bring down the pro-Iranian Assad regime and install, instead, a pragmatic government representing the Sunni majority. It could also strengthen the Sunni and Christian forces in Lebanon, who oppose the expansion of Shiite Hezbollah.

And finally, the new Sunni alliance, especially Turkey and Qatar, could motivate Hamas to cut itself off from Iran and to join the PLO in a comprehensive agreement with Israel.

Prof. Maoz is a senior researcher at the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University and a fellow at Mitvim.