Despite the focus on Khan Yunis, Rafah, surprisingly, emerges as a more intricate trap, as the conflict there poses significant challenges on multiple levels.
jpost
As the IDF deepens its activities in the southern Gaza Strip, the media concentrates on Khan Yunis. Given that the city, the adjacent refugee camp, and its tunnels are perceived as potential strongholds of Hamas leadership and the location where Israeli captives might be held, the focus on Khan Yunis is understandable. However, despite the complexity and the heavy human cost of the fighting in Khan Yunis, Rafah, in particular, appears to be a more complex trap, as the conflict there presents significant challenges in the bilateral, regional, and international arenas.
Since Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai in 1982, Rafah has been divided between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Even after the Oslo Accords were implemented, Israel continued to control the Rafah crossing and the strip that separates Palestinian territory from Egyptian territory – the ‘Philadelphi Corridor.’ This route quickly became a hub for terrorist activities against IDF forces and a conduit for smuggling weapons from Sinai through the tunnels.
Weapon smuggling increased after the disengagement in 2005, and with Hamas taking control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, it became even more rampant. Following ‘Operation Protective Edge’ in 2014, Egypt began taking action against weapon smuggling by demolishing houses on the Egyptian side of Rafah and by flooding the tunnels along the Egyptian border.
If and when the IDF takes control of Rafah, it will have significant implications. In the bilateral arena, the occupation of Palestinian Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor will not only increase the risk of unwanted shooting incidents between the IDF and the Egyptian army but will also violate the peace agreement between the two countries.
According to the agreement, Israel is prohibited from deploying tanks and artillery east of the border in the narrow strip (‘Area D’), allowing only the placement of four IDF battalions and no more than 180 armored personnel carriers.
The temporary or permanent occupation of Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor may lead to Israel violating this clause in the peace agreement, potentially sparking tensions with Egypt or prompting a demand for the reinforcement of Egyptian forces in Sinai, and while changes to the agreement’s clauses are possible, they require the consent of both parties.
Additionally, the presence of Israeli forces in Rafah and along the Philadelphi Corridor may put Egypt in a dilemma. Egypt might soon be asked by Israel to act from the Egyptian side to block the channels of weapons transfer to the remaining terrorist elements in the Gaza Strip. Egyptian approval of such a request could be interpreted as an agreement to Israeli control of the strip.
Egypt’s major concern, as evident from the early days of the conflict, is the influx of refugees from the Gaza Strip to Sinai. Egypt vehemently opposes this due to several reasons: besides being an economically struggling country with limited capacity to support the Palestinian refugee population, Egypt fears being perceived in the Arab world as aiding Israel in expelling or mistreating Palestinians. Furthermore, the presence of Palestinian terrorist activities in Sinai, along Israel’s border, could lead to confrontations between Egypt and Israel if these elements act against Israel from Egyptian territory.
Internationally, control over the Palestinian side of the Rafah crossing holds significant implications. While Israel states that it has no intention of managing the civil affairs of the Gaza Strip and taking responsibility for the economy of its residents, international law dictates that Israeli control on the Palestinian side of the Rafah crossing would make Israel responsible, in the eyes of the world, for the livelihood and economy of the Gaza Strip population.
In any scenario, any Israeli move in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor will require Israel to negotiate and cooperate with Egypt on this matter, taking into serious consideration Egypt’s positions and needs. In particular, Egypt is a preferred regional mediator for Israel not only in dealing with the issue of hostages but also in all matters related to communication channels with any Palestinian authority in the Gaza Strip. Failure to consider Egypt’s needs might result in a catastrophe, leading to the restoration of the Muslim Brotherhood’s control in Egypt and the return to power of Hamas’ ideological patrons.
The question of ‘the day after’ the war is closely linked to Rafah. So far, Israel has not provided the international community with an answer regarding the future of the Gaza Strip. The government has emphasized what it does not want (‘Hamasstan’ or ‘Fatahstan’), but it has not clarified what it does want. One assumption is that Israel prefers moderate Sunni Arab states – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan – to manage the Gaza Strip, either in a civilian or military capacity.
Different factors in Egypt have already clarified that Egypt has no intention of controlling the Gaza Strip. However, even if Egypt agrees to participate in future arrangements, such as sending Egyptian workers to assist in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, Israel will need to take into account Egypt’s position regarding Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor.